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REPLY
Introduction

TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
and Summary

of Argument

Respondent George J. Tenet, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency ("respondent"), devotes virtually his entire
opposition brief to defending the merits of the Fourth Circuit's
ruling that district courts lack jurisdiction under Title VII in feeonly cases. But nowhere does respondent deny the i_portanee
of this case to the tens of thousands of federal employees who
bring discrimination charges each year, or to the thousands
more who bring discrimination claims before state and local
agencies. Nor does respondent effectively address petitioner's
showing that the ruling below creates serious disarray in the
lower courts on the jurisdictional reach of Title VII and statutes
modeled on it. As the Petition demonstrates, the Fourth
Circuit's ruling is at odds with this Court's holding in New York
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), with the holdings
of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in similar Title VII cases, and
with the uniform case law construing the jurisdictional
provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), which in all relevant respects is identical to that in
Title VII.
The Petition anticipated and addressed most of the
respondent's arguments, and hence this reply does not answer
them one-by-one. Rather, we make two points. First, there is,
in fact, a serious conflict in the law in this area which calls out
for this Court's review. Until the ruling below, every court to
address whether Title VII authorizes fee-only litigation
concluded that it does; the Fourth Circuit, at the government's
urging, has now broken ranks and its ruling unsettles what had
long been stable, uniform law. Review is warranted to resolve
the conflict in this important area of the law.
Second, the ruling below, if allowed to stand, creates
substantial incentives for Title VII plaintiffs to abandon state
and federal administrative dispute resolution proceedings as
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soon as they are able to, and to head to federal court, thereby
avoiding the risk of under-compensation that is inevitable under
the Fourth Circuit's ruling. The ruling therefore jeopardizes
Congress' effort to encoa_age the administrative resolution of
Title VII disputes.
I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S
ODDS WITH PREVAILING
LAW.

RULING

IS AT

A. The Conflict With Carey. Respondent's effort to
minimize the confusion created by the Fourth Circuit's ruling
is off target. Respondent begins, not by addressing Carey, but
by accusing petitioner of offering "no textual analysis of the
pertinent provisions of Title VII," suggesting that the question
presented in this case comes before the Court on a blank slate.
Respondent's Brief in Opposition ("Opp. Br.") at 7. It is
respondent who fails to address the plain and unambiguous
language of Title VlI's jurisdictional provision, which was
authoritatively construed in Carey, and discussed in the Petition
at 11-12.
Title VII's jurisdictional provision, section 2000e5(0(3), provides that "[e]ach United States district court...
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Federal employees
,like petitioner are required to exhaust their administrative
remedies prior to filing suit. The provision authorizing suits by
government employees provides that if "an employee" is
"aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint...
[he]
may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this
title .... "Id. § 2000e-16(c). Thus, the jurisdictional language
of section 2000e-5(t0(3 ) governs here, and the question is
whether an action to enforce Title VII's attorney's fee provision
is one "brought under this subchapter." As this Court explicitly
held in Carey, the answer to that question is yes. Carey, 447
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U.S. at 66 (Title VII's "authorization of a civil suit in federal
court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney's
fees for legal work done in state or local proceedings").
Respondent contends otherwise. Carey did not resolve
this question, argues respondent, because in Carey the plaintiff
attorney's fees. Therefore, respondent maintains, Carey does
"not address the question whether a plaintiff who has
participated in state administrative proceedings can maintain an
independent suit solely for fees." Opp. Br. at 11-12 (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original).
But respondent also
acknowledges (id. at 12) that in cases where
fees are not available in the administrative
proceedings--as in Carey, 447 U.S. at 67 n.7--then
an independent action to recover fees should be
permitted because such an action provides the sole
opportunity for recovery. Id. at 65-66 (noting that
"availability of fees should not depend upon the
"fortuity" that a plaintiff "ultimately finds it
necessary to sue in federal court to obtain relief
other than attorney's fees").
Respondent thus makes the remarkable claim that
different jurisdictional rules apply to different plaintiffs based,
not on any variation in the language of section 2000e-5(0(3),
but exclusively on whether attorney's fees were available in the
underlying administrative proceeding. If fees were available,
there is no jurisdiction; if fees were unavailable, district court
jurisdiction lies. Based on this interpretation of the Act -accepted by no court outside the Fourth Circuit -- respondent
contends that, because attorney's fees may be awarded by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, petitioner's claim
here is foreclosed. The same rule would also apply to claimants
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who prevailed on the merits in state and local administrative
proceedings, but were disappointed by an inadequate fee.
Under respondent's theory, they too would be precluded from
challenging the inadequate fee in federal court.
The signal defect in respondent's approach is that
nothing in the jurisdictional provision of Title VII draws the
line respondent and the Fourth Circuit invented. Section 2000e5(0(3) does not say, as the respondent appears to suggest, that
fee-only cases may be brought where fees are unavailable
administratively but may not be brought where they are. And
certainly nothing in this Court's opinion in Carey supports this
theory; indeed, this Court's holding in Carey contradicts it. The
decision below cannot be reconciled with Carey, which
underscores the need for review. 1

lIn a fall-back argument that applies only to federal
employees, respondent contends that the right to bring a feeonly case against the government is foreclosed by section
2000e-16(d), which says: "The provisions of section 2000e-5(f)
through (k) of this title [the jurisdictional and remedial
provisions], as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought
hereunder .... "A suit for fees only is barred by section 16(d)'s
"brought hereunder" language, according to respondent,
because that language assumes the pendency of a preexisting
suit. Opp. Br. at 8-10. That reading of section 16(d) stretches
the meaning of the "brought hereunder" language past the
breaking point, and has been accepted only by the Fourth
Circuit. Section 16(d)'s purpose is to ensure that in Title VII
cases the government is treated no better and no worse than
private litigants. See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 222-23
(1999); see also id_ at 225-26 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). To
argue that section 16(d) limits the right of a Title VII plaintiff
(continued...)

B.

The Fourth Circuit's Ruling Conflicts With
Eighth And Tenth Circuit Rulings.
The Petition
demonstrates that the ruling below conflicts with decisions of
both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. Jones v. American State
Bank; 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1988); Slade for Estate ofSlade v.
Postal Service, 952 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1991). Respondent
attempts in vain to distinguish these cases, but relies on reasons
that have nothing to do with the scope of Title VII's
jurisdictional provision. Jones, respondent claims, is
disfmg,.f_sihab[e
¢3nthe same ground as Carey; that is, attorney'_
fees were unavailable in the state administrative proceeding in
which the plaintiff had obtained merits relief. But as Judge
Heaney so aptly put it, that is "a distinction without a
difference" in determining whether the district court had
jurisdiction to entertain a fee-only case. 857 F.2d at 497.
Respondent argues that Slade is distinguishable as well because,
like the plaintiff in Carey, the Slade plaintiff initially sought
merits relief in court and hence the Tenth Circuit was not
presented with the question of whether a fee-only case is
authorized under Title VII. That is not, however, how the Tenth
Circuit saw the case. Rather, its ruling is explicitly premised on
Carey's holding that Title Vii's "'authorization of a civil suit in

1(...continued)
who has been denied an adequate fee at the EEOC to bring suit,
notwithstanding the direct authorization of such litigation in
sections 5(f)(3) and 16(c), stands the purpose of section 16(c)
on its head. Even worse, the argument draws too much from
too little. If respondent were correct about the meaning of the
"brought hereunder" language, then courts would be forbidden
from entertaining suits for back pay, injunctions, or other relief
authorized by section 5(g), where the parties have agreed that
there was a violation of law, but still dispute the remedy.
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federal court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of
attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local
proceedings.'" 952 F.2d at 361 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 66)
(emphasis added).
By splitting hairs over whether Jones and Slade are
distinguishable from this case, respondent is trying to obscure
the forest with the trees. The forest here-- wholly unaddressed
by respondent -- is that the decision below breaks ranks with
every prior decision interpreting the jurisdictional reach of Title
VII, and therefore, this case merits review.
C. The Decision Below Threatens Enforcement Of
IDEA.
The Petition demonstrates (at pp. 16-17) that the
decision below conflicts with a substantial body of case law
interpreting the jurisdictional provision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B), which
has been consistently construed to authorize fee-only cases.
The Petition explains that when Congress added a fee provision
to IDEA in 1986 Congress used Title VlI's jurisdictional
provision as its model because it wanted to ensure that parents
who prevailed in administrative proceedings under IDEA could
seek fees in court.
Respondent nowhere takes issue with our analysis of
IDEA. Nor does respondent dispute that the Fourth Circuit's
decision threatens to destabilize the law under IDEA, which has
been uniform for more than a decade. Instead, respondent tries
to explain away the interpretative approach of the IDEA courts
by arguing that they "have undoubtedly been influenced by a
similar difficult choice between allowing independent actions
solely to recover attorney's fees for work performed in
mandatory administrative proceedings or allowing no recovery
of fees whatsoever to the most successful plaintiffs (who have
no need to file suit on the merits in court)." Opp. Br. at 17-18.
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That observation may be correct, but it is wholly irrelevant here.
Respondent does not explain why that "difficult choice" is in
any way affected by the language of IDEA's jurisdictional
provision, which is identical in all pertinent respects to Title
VII's, or how the manner in which IDEA courts have resolved
that choice can be reconciled with the decision below. Because
the Fourth Circuit's ruling threatens the uniform enforcement
of not just Title VII, but IDEA as well, review by this Court is
warranted.
D. The Continuing Confusion Over Carey And Crest
Street. Perhaps the most glaring defect in respondent's position
is its refusal to confront the obvious fact that lower courts are
having difficulty navigating between the Carey rule -- that
district courts have jurisdiction in Title VII fee-only cases -and the rule announced in North Carolina Department of
Transportationv. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S.
6 (1986) -- that district courts do not have jurisdiction over
independent suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to recover attorney's
fees under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The tension
between the two decisions is palpable and undeniable. Almost
every court to address jurisdiction in a fees-only case brought
under Title VII, IDEA, or section 1988 has had to wrestle with
whether Carey or Crest Street governs. To be sure, until the
ruling below, the courts in Title VII and IDEA cases have all
held that Carey, not Crest Street, governs. But now that the
Fourth Circuit, at the government's urging, has broken ranks,
this Court should grant review and definitively settle the
question.
II. THE DECISION BELOW WILL FRUSTRATE
TITLE VII'S DEFERRAL SCHEME.
The Petition explains that the ruling below also should
be reviewed because it provides a powerful, albeit perverse,
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incentive for Title VII claimants to abandon the administrative
process to avoid the risk of under-compensation on fee matters.
As we observed, the ruling below has no limiting principle, and
would bar prevailing Title VII claimants from challenging
administrative fee decisions in court even if fees were denied
outright.
response.

Respondent

makes two points that merit a brief

First, respondent disagrees with our forecast that the
decision below will prompt an exodus from the EEOC, as well
as its counterpart state and local agencies, and contends that "it
is more reasonable to assume that plaintiffs will simply settle
their fee dispute in the same forum where they settle their
merits claim." Opp. Br. at 18. Other than unbridled optimism,
however, respondent offers no reason why Title VII claimants
would stay in an administrative forum and risk serious undercompensation or even non-compensation when they can go to
court and be guaranteed market-rate based compensation.
Indeed, respondent's argument was flatly rejected in Carey,
where the Court stressed that "the existence of an incentive to
get into federal court," such as the prospect of a full attorney fee
award, "would ensure that almost all Title VII complainants
would abandon" administrative proceedings as soon as possible.
447 U.S. at 66 n.6. Respondent advocates a rule that would
expand and complicate federal litigation by requiring Title VII
plaintiffs to include other claims with their relatively
straightforward claims for fees, just to ensure jurisdiction. See
id. (noting that "such a ground could almost always be found").
Second, respondent theorizes that permitting fees-only
litigation under Title VII "would encourage needless litigation
in federal courts." Opp. Br. at 18. Respondent speculates that,
rather than settle for below-market-rates at the EEOC,
claimant's lawyers would "use federal courts as routine arbiters
of fee disputes." But that argument is an exercise in question-
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begging. As this Court recognized in West v. Gibson, 527 U.S.
212, 218-220 (1999), Title VII litigants will inevitably migrate
to federal court where they believe that the administrative
process has limited remedial power or where, as here, will
exercise it adversely to them. See also Carey, 447 U.S. at 66
& n.6. So long as administrative agencies like the EEOC
persist in short-changing complainants, complainants will
exercise the option that Congress gave them of leaving the
administrative process and pursuing their remedies in federal
court. Indeed, that was the central theme of this Court's rulings
in Westand Carey.
That was also the point of Congress' broad grant of
authority for federal employees to bring suit. Section 2000e16(c) authorizes federal employees to "file a civil action as
provided by section 2000e-5(f)(3) of this title" whenever they
are "aggrieved by the final disposition of the complaint." There
is nothing in section 16(c), or anywhere else in Title VII, that
deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over attorney's fees
issues. Agency decisions are ordinarily subject to judicial
review, see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971), and there is no evidence that Congress
sought to deprive federal courts of the power to review EEOC
decisions on any matter, including fees. See, e.g., Block v.
CommunityNutritionInstitute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984). Indeed, it
is hard to imagine a more comprehensive authorization of suit
than section 16(c). Despite all of this, respondent insists that
EEOC fee decisions are immune from judicial review, even
where the EEOC denied a fee to a prevailing complainant for no
reason at all. That result cannot be squared with section 16(c),
the normal rules governing judicial review of agency action, or
the remedial purpose of Title VII. Yet that is the consequence
of the Fourth Circuit's ruling.

I
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As we emphasized in the Petition, the Fourth Circuit's
ruling deals a body blow to the effective enforcement of Title
VII, which depends both on the ability of claimants to obtain
full relief before administrative tribunals like the EEOC and on
the ready availability of a reasonable attorney's fee for a
prevailing plaintiff. Because of its adverse impact on the
enforcement of Title VII, this case merits review by this Court.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the Petition, the
petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
David C. Vladeck
(Counsel of Record)
Tanya Y. Bartucz
Alan B. Morrison
Public Citizen Litigation Group
1600 20 th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 588-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner

